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COMMENTS 
The Regulation of Investment Advice: Subscription 
Advisers and Fiduciary Duties 
The subscription adviser, who advises his clients through market 
services and other publications, plays a significant role in the securi-
ties industry. Holding himself out to the public as an expert in 
investment analysis, he provides individual investors with infor-
mation and recommendations regarding investment opportunities 
in the securities market. In addition, and in contrast to the advice 
given by a broker-dealer pursuant to a selling effort, his advice is 
represented as being both disinterested and competent. The recent 
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets1 indicated, however, 
that the advice offered by subscription advisers frequently does not 
conform to these purported standards. The Special Study noted such 
abusive practices as the use of highly misleading sales literature de-
signed to excite the investor's desire for quick profits2 and the failure 
to undertake research in conformity to standards professed to the 
client in support of recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold 
particular securities.3 
To protect the investor relying upon subscription advice, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has consistently taken the 
position that the adviser is a fiduciary to his client and therefore 
stands in a confidential relationship. In the landmark decision of 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,4 the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the Commission's interpretation of an ad-
viser's quasi-fiduciary status under the Investment Advisers Act of 
19405 by holding fraudulent the failure of a subscription adviser 
to disclose to his clients his practice of acquiring securities before 
recommending their purchase, with the intent to resell immediately 
after the recommendation. It is the purpose of this comment to 
examine the major problems attending the dissemination of in-
vestment advice by subscription advisers, to evaluate those prob-
lems in the light of the higher standards of disclosure now judicially 
required of these advisers, and to suggest solutions to the still un-
answered problems presented. 
I. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited 
as special Study]. 
2. Id. at 367-69. 
3. Id. at 363-67. 
4. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
5. 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to -21 (1958), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2 to -6, -8 to -11, -17, -18a (Supp. V, 1964). 
(1220] 
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J. THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY INDUSTRY6 
The general term "investment adviser" is used indiscriminately 
to describe t\V'O classes of advisers:7 investment counselors and sub-
scription advisers. The former offer direct personal supervision of 
a client's investment portfolio. After analyzing an individual client's 
financial needs, means, and objectives, the investment counselor 
formulates an investment program for the client's account.8 Typi-
cally, the investment counselor will enter into an agency agreement 
with the client wherein the counselor is given either complete or 
limited discretion to invest and reinvest the client's funds and 
securities.9 Thbs, the investment counselor is an actual fiduciary 
and is accountable for misapplication or commingling of a client's 
funds or securities. This type of personal management is expensive, 
however, and is usually practical only for wealthy clients, such as 
pension and endowment funds, with a minimum of approximately 
100,000 dollars to invest.10 In quality and resources, investment 
counselors vary from large well-managed firms of over three hundred 
employees supervising up to three billion dollars in assets to much 
smaller firms with a minimum of invested capital and trained 
personnel.11 
The second type of investment adviser is the subscription ad-
viser. Comprising an estimated 160 firms,12 subscription advisers 
mail to the investor a weekly or biweekly letter summarizing the 
present condition of, and future prospects for, the economy and the 
stock market and making a number of specific recommendations 
regarding particular securities. Fees are modest, ranging from fifty 
to 150 dollars annually.13 The recommendations are classified into 
6. The past two decades have seen a steady growth in the number of investment 
advisers in response to the investment advice requirements of a burgeoning class of 
individual investors. There are presently 1,613 registered investment advisers com-
pared with 780 in 1945. This number is not as large as the record high of 1,959 
individuals and firms registered during the bull market in 1961. 11 SEC ANN. REP. 
78 (1945); Hillery, The Market Letters, The Wall Street J., Sept. 30, 1964, p. I, 
col. 1. 
7. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(ll), 54 Stat. 848 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) 
(1958). The definition of investment adviser also includes those who collect and 
disseminate financial and statistical data and those who publish financial analyses for 
the benefit of other investment advisers. These are not specifically discussed herein 
except to the e.xtent that the regulatory problems presented are applicable to all 
investment advisers. As used in this comment, the term investment adviser refers to 
both investment counselors and subscription advisers. 
8. See Special Study 369-71; Wise, How To Stay Rich, Fortune, Nov. 1961, p. 132. 
9. Ibid. Many of the larger investment counseling firms do not have custody of 
clients' funds or securities, although they may be placed in the possession of a broker 
authorized to act on the instructions of the account supervisor. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Id. at 135. 
12. Hillery, supra note 6, at 1. A number of investment advisers are both subscrip-
tion advisers and investment counselors. 
13. Some investment advisers, such as United Business Service and Standard and 
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categories conforming to particular investment objectives, such as 
income, growth, and speculation; securities are evaluated by refer-
ence to criteria the adviser considers important, including estimated 
future earnings and dividends, market behavior of stock prices, and 
recommendations of other subscription advisers. The subscription 
adviser has no knowledge of the financial condition and objectives of 
the individual investor-subscriber and, thus, must leave with the 
latter the decision whether to follow the distributed prognostications. 
In size and resources, subscription advisers similarly vary from large 
firms, such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's, to small one-man 
enterprises.14 
A. Federal Regulation 
Until its amendment in 1960, the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 was the weakest and least effective of the federal securities 
acts.15 Before this amendment, the significant portions of the act 
required the registration of both subscription advisers and invest-
ment counselors with the Commission.16 The Commission could 
deny a registration if the investment adviser had willfully made any 
false or misleading statement in the registration filed with the 
Commission or had been convicted within the ten years prior to 
registration of specified felonies or misdemeanors involving securi-
ties or misuse of funds, provided the rejection would be in the 
Poor's, also provide in their reports information on current market advice of other 
advisers, as well as industry surveys, bond and currency rates, chart studies, general 
business conditions, and many other developments relevant to investment analysis. See 
Business Week, Sept. 5, 1959, p. 115; Fortune, Oct. 1959, p. 141. 
14. Ibid. 
15. 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1393 (2d ed. 1961). The other federal securities 
acts are: the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a•aa (1958), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(6) (Supp. V, 1964); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-l (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c to 78d-2 (Supp. V, 1964); 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 48 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z 
(1958); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1958), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd (Supp. V, 1964); and the Investment Company Act of 
1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1958), as amended, §§ 80a-2, -6, -8, -39 
(Supp. V, 1964). 
16. Not all persons rendering investment advice are included within the definition 
of investment adviser under the act. Bankers, lawyers, accountants, brokers, and 
dealers, for instance, are excluded when their advice is solely incidental to the conduct 
of their business. The protection of the act is obviated by the fact that the law other-
wise imposes a fiduciary duty upon them. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(ll), 54 Stat. 
848 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1958). Furthermore, certain investment advisers are 
exempt from the registration requirement of the act. A type of "intrastate" exemption 
is given to an investment adviser all of whose clients are residents of the state in which 
his principal place of business is located if he does not furnish advice with respect to 
any security traded on a national securities exchange. Also exempt are investment 
advisers who in the preceding twelve months had fewer than fifteen clients and did not 
hold themselves out to the public as investment advisers. In addition, investment 
advisers whose only clients are investment and insurance companies need not register. 
Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1958). 
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public interest.17 In addition, the act proscribed fraud and deceit 
by an investment adviser in his dealings with a client or prospective 
client.18 It also prohibited provisions in investment advisory con-
tracts calling £or compensation to the investment adviser on the 
basis of capital gains from, or appreciation of, securities purchased 
or permitting assignment of the contract by the investment adviser 
without the client's consent.19 
The 1960 Amendments included several provisions intended to 
strengthen the act. First, the Commission was empowered to pre-
scribe the books and records an investment adviser must keep and 
to inspect them whenever necessary to protect investors; formerly 
the SEC only had power to require the filing of reports.20 A regu-
lation under this provision requires that investment advisers main-
tain extensive financial statements and records of all correspondence 
and transactions involving their clients; these statements and rec-
ords must be retained for at least five years.21 Second, in perhaps 
the most significant amendment, the Commission was given substan-
tive rule-making power to define "fraudulent, deceptive and manip-
ulative" practices and to prescribe means reasonably designed to 
prevent them.22 The Commission can thus promulgate standards 
for investment adviser behavior which it formerly could create only 
through adjudication, and it has implemented this power by two 
regulations. The first imposes certain obligations upon an invest-
ment counselor having a client's funds and securities in his posses-
sion,23 and the second limits the contents of subscription adviser 
advertisements.24 The new amendments did not, however, attempt 
to impose any requirement that the investment adviser possess 
any particular degree of expertise in investment analysis. Conse-
17. Investment Advisers Act § 203(d), 54 Stat. 851 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(d) 
(1958). 
18. Investment Advisers Act §§ 206(1)-(2), 54 Stat. 852 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1) to 
(2) (1958). 
19. Investment Advisers Act § 205, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1958). 
20. Investment Advisers Act § 204, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1958), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (Supp. V, 1964). 
21. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204·2 (1964). 
22. Section 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. V, 1964) 
now provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective 
client; 
"(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates 
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; ••• 
"(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this 
paragraph .•• prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts, practices, 
and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 
23. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (1964). 
24. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (1964). See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text. 
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quently, virtually any individual without a criminal record can 
become a subscription adviser or investment counselor.25 
The Investment Advisers Act presently provides the Commis-
sion with a number of sanctions against unlawful investment ad-
viser behavior. The SEC may seek a criminal conviction against 
any investment adviser who willfully violates the act or any rule, 
regulation, or order promulgated thereunder. 26 The criminal sanc-
tion, however, is a drastic remedy which the Commission has used 
sparingly.27 In addition, the Commission is empowered to revoke or 
to suspend, for a period not exceeding twelve months, an invest-
ment adviser's registration for any violation of the act resulting in 
a criminal conviction or in a permanent or temporary injunction, 
provided the revocation or suspension is in the public interest.28 
Finally, the Commission may enjoin any act or practice of the in-
vestment adviser constituting a violation of any provision of the 
act or any rule or regulation thereunder.29 While no provision of 
the act expressly imposes civil liability upon investment advisers, 
and it has not been implied under the antifraud provisions,30 
absence of explicit statutory authorization has not precluded federal 
courts from applying civil liability under the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act in cases involving fraudulent transactions in se-
curities.31 Moreover, because of its powerful deterrent effect, civil 
liability has been advocated by both the Commission32 and the 
Special Study. The Special Study specifically recommended that 
civil liability be imposed upon subscription advisers who intention-
ally or recklessly disseminate fraudulent investment advice.33 As 
the Investment Advisers Act becomes a stronger regulatory device, 
it appears that there will be an increased likelihood of recovery 
25. The Special Study suggests that this lack of qualification requirements results in 
substandard personnel in the industry as a whole. See Special Study 146-48, 158-59. 
26. Investment Advisers Act§ 217, 54 Stat. 857 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 
(Supp. V, 1964). 
27. The SEC Annual Reports since 1940 indicate that there have been only two 
criminal convictions under the Investment Advisers Act. 
28. Investment Advisers Act § 203(d), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-3(d) (Supp. V, 1964). 
29. Investment Advisers Act § 209(e), 54 Stat. 854 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-9(e) (Supp. V, 1964). 
30. In Hull v. Newman, Kennedy &: Co., Civil No. 118-283, S.D.N.Y., a private 
action for damages was brought under the act and the Commission filed an amicus 
curiae brief in support of the civil cause of action. However, the question of implied 
civil liability was never litigated because the case was settled out of court. See 24 SEC 
ANN. REP. 162 (1959). Nevertheless, the investor would still have a common-law action 
for deceit. 
31. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1763-97. 
32. See case cited note 30 supra and text accompanying note 99 infra. 
33. The Special Study 387 suggests that failure of a subscription adviser to consider 
the most recently filed official disclosure by issuers, when he purports to do so, should 
be one of the factors considered in determining whether such advice is recklessly 
disseminated. 
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under it for an aggrieved investor.34 In addition, the usual re-
quirement of buyer-seller privity in civil actions brought under the 
Securities Exchange Act may not pose an obstacle to civil liability 
under section 206 because the latter is not restricted to fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.35 Moreover, some 
courts have dispensed with the privity limitation when the injured 
party is among the class of persons who could be expected to rely 
upon the defendant's misrepresentation.36 
B. State Regulation 
Although it is a comparatively recent development, state regula-
tion of subscription advisers and investment counselors is growing 
in importance. In 1958 only sixteen states required the registration 
of investment advisers,37 but by 1965 the number had risen to 
twenty-five.38 In ten of the states which have adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act, the state securities commissioner has the power to 
deny, suspend, or revoke an application for registration if he feels 
that the applicant is unqualified on the basis of such factors as 
training, experience, and knowledge of the securities business, pro-
vided the action is in the public interest.39 In twelve other states,40 
34. Ibid. 
35. Section IO(b) and Rule IOb-5 of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b) (1958) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1964), proscribe fraudulent representations in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Some courts have interpreted this 
language to require that the injured party actually have purchased from or sold to the 
defendant. See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), afj'd mem., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Section 206 of the Investment 
Advisers Act, however, simply proscribes fraud by an investment adviser in interstate 
commerce. Hence, an injured investor, while not a client of an investment adviser, 
could conceivably recover damages where he reasonably relied on the adviser's 
fraudulent advice. 
36. E.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also 
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Arguably, the fiduciary relationship of an 
investment counselor with his client fulfills any privity requirement. The investment 
counselor may be held on the theory that he should be held strictly accountable for 
any breach of the duty of complete disclosure owed to each client. In the case of the 
subscription adviser, however, there is the added consideration that the same advice is 
published and mailed to a large number of investors with the consequence that the 
subscription adviser may be subjected to unlimited liability. It may be that the contract 
for investment advice would suffice to establish privity. In such situations, however, 
the courts have been reluctant to impose civil liability for mere negligence. See Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
37. See Loss & CowETI, BLUE SKY LAw 20-21 (1958). 
38. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vvashington, and 'Wisconsin. 
39. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r § 204(a)(l) & (a)(2)(I). The states having adopted this 
provision of the act are Alaska, Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and ·washington. 
40. California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and "Wisconsin. 
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registration is similarly predicated on passing an examination or 
on some other showing that the applicant is qualified to conduct 
an investment advisory business. Hence, unlike the Investment 
Advisers Act, some state laws do impose entrance requirements; no 
accurate data are available, however, concerning the stringency with 
which the standards are set and enforced. 
The Uniform Securities Act,41 adopted in 1956 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, represents 
the most comprehensive attempt to regulate subscription advisers 
and investment counselors on the state level. Many of its provisions, 
such as the antifraud provision42 and the requirement that an 
investment advisory contract may neither be assigned without the 
client's consent43 nor based upon appreciation of the securities 
purchased,44 are modeled after the Investment Advisers Act. How-
ever, the Uniform Securities Act contains a number of significant 
innovations not found in the Investment Advisers Act. In addition 
to empowering the state commissioner to control the qualifications 
of investment advisers,45 · the Uniform Act permits the state com-
missioner to establish minimum capitalization requirements for 
investment advisers in order to protect against insolvency.46 This 
latter provision is particularly important as applied to investment 
counselors, who may have funds and securities of their clients in 
custody. The Uniform Act also requires that a portion of the in-
vestment advisory contract be in writing.47 Furthermore, while the 
Uniform Securities Act provides that no civil liability may be 
implied from an investment adviser's violation of the antifraud 
provisions, it permits the commissioner to require the posting of 
a bond by advisers whose net capital does not exceed 25,000 dollars 
and to determine who may receive its benefits.48 Hence, in limited 
circumstances, clients injured by the machinations of an investment 
adviser may have an available remedy, although the adviser is not 
subjected to personal liability. 
C. Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation does not yet play an important role in the 
control of subscription adviser and investment counselor conduct. 
At present there is one private organization composed solely of the 
larger investment counselor firms. In its charter and bylaws, the 
41. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r §§ 101-419. 
42. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r § 102(a). 
43. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r § I02(b)(2). 
44. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r § I02(b)(I). 
45. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. 
46. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r § 202(d). 
47. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r § I02(b). 
48. UNIFORM SECURITIES Ac:r §§ 410(h), 202(e) &: comment. 
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Investment Counsel Association of America espouses high principles 
of professional conduct.49 However, limited size and lack of effective 
sanctions due to the purely private and voluntary character of the 
organization have caused its influence upon the industry as a whole 
to be minimal.150 The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts was 
formed in 1959 to promote the professional recognition of finan-
cial analysts, including investment advisers, broker-dealers, and em-
ployees in the research departments of those firms, banks, insurance 
companies, or investment companies.151 The Institute's objective is 
to foster higher educational standards in the field of financial 
analysis by conducting examinations designed to test individual 
competence and skill. An individual who meets the requirements 
is designated a "chartered financial analyst." In the long run, the 
Institute may contribute substantially to raising the standards of 
the advisory industry. At present, however, it is in its infancy and 
unable to exert any appreciable sanctions on the behavior of sub-
scription advisers or investment counselors.52 
The Special Study recommended that the advisory industry be 
organized into an official self-regulatory body, comparable to the 
National Association of Securities Dealers for broker-dealers, which, 
under the supervision of the Commission, would have the authority 
to adopt and enforce substantive rules regulating its membership.153 
This recommendation is a sound and constructive one which should 
be implemented. Organization of the industry into one association 
or into separate associations for subscription advisers and invest-
ment counselors could help alleviate the Commission's task of de-
veloping and enforcing needed controls and regulations for both 
types of investment advisers.154 At the same time, a self-regulatory 
body would provide the industry with a convenient forum to define 
and express its own consensus on issues affecting it. However, as 
in the case of the NASD,155 legislative direction will probably be 




53. Id. at 159, 387. 
54. An example of a standard developed by a self-regulatory body and now enforced 
by the Commission is Article III, § 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice, in NATIONAL Ass'N 
OF SECURITIES DEALERS, MANUAL D-1: "In recommending to a customer the purchase, 
sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer as to his other security 
holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." Under this so-called suitability 
rule, the broker-dealer or his salesman has an obligation to ascertain the financial 
responsibility and objectives of the prospective purchaser and to make a recommenda-
tion which serves his best interests; the rule constitutes a very high standard of 
professional conduct. The Commission has not formally adopted this rule but has 
utilized it in a few "boiler-room" cases. See e.g., MacRobins & Co., SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962, affd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 
137 (2d Cir. 1963); Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960). 
55. The NASD is registered with the SEC pursuant to Securities Exchange Act 
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necessary before self-regulation can be achieved among investment 
advisers. 
II. THE SUBSCRIPTION ADVISER AS A FIDUCIARY 
The Supreme Court's initial consideration of the Investment 
Advisers Act in the Capital Gains case is highly significant because 
of the express development and adoption of a fiduciary standard 
of conduct for subscription advisers and investment counselors. In 
Capital Gains, defendants Capital Gains Research Bureau and its 
mvner Harry Schwarzmann, registered subscription advisers, pub-
lished the Capital Gains Report, which was mailed monthly to 
approximately five thousand subscribers at an annual subscription 
rate of eighteen dollars. 56 The report, which might be distributed 
on a trial basis to an additional 100,000 investors, gave advice per-
taining to the achievement of long-term capital gains through the 
selection of undervalued high-grade securities for its clients. On six 
different occasions benveen March 15 and November 7, 1960, the 
defendants purchased shares of a particular security before recom-
mending it in their report as a long-term investment. In each 
instance defendants sold their shares at a profit a few days after the 
purchase and recommendation, when the volume of trading and 
the price of the security had risen, without disclosing either trans-
action to their clients.51 The Commission sought an injunction to 
compel the defendants to disclose this practice, known as scalping, 
alleging that, since defendants were fiduciaries owing a duty of 
complete disclosure to their clients, scalping operated as a fraud 
and deceit within the meaning of sections 206(1) and (2) of the act.08 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the injunc-
tion, holding that, even assuming the defendants were fiduciaries, 
section 206 incorporated the terms fraud and deceit in the tra-
ditional common-law sense59 requiring proof by the Commission of 
§ 15A, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (1958). It was the main purpose of 
the Maloney Act of 1938, which added § 15A to the Exchange Act, to provide for a 
self-regulatory association in the over-the-counter market. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra 
note 15, at 1359-64. 
56. 375 U.S. 180, 183 (1963). 
57. On another occasion defendants sold short a security before recommending its 
sale and then covered a few days after distribution of the report, when the price of 
the security had declined. Id. at 202. 
58. Section 206(4), proscribing any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practice, 
was enacted subsequent to the majority of violations by defendants and was, therefore, 
not considered by the Court in the determination of this case. The Senate Report 
noted that § 206(4) "would enable the Commission to deal adequately with such 
problems as a material adverse interest in securities which the adviser is recommending 
to his clients." S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960). 
59. At common law the elements of deceit were (I) a false representation (2) of a 
material fact (3) made with knowledge or belief that the representation is false 
and (4) for the purpose of inducing another to rely thereon; there must be (5) justifiable 
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the defendants' intent to injure their clients and of a subsequent 
actual injury.60 The Supreme Court reversed and granted the in-
junction, holding that defendants, as investment advisers, entered 
into a relationship of trust and confidence with their clients which 
subjected them to the general duties of acting in utmost good faith, 
remaining impartial and objective, avoiding situations in which a 
possible conflict of interest might arise, and disclosing all facts 
essential to an intelligent decision by the client. Thus, since 
defendants' practice of scalping created a duality of interest which 
impaired their capacity to render impartial and objective advice, 
failure to disclose their personal interest violated the proscriptions 
of the act.61 The Court analyzed the duty of the investment ad-
viser as applied to defendants thus: 
"An adviser who, like respondents, secretly trades on the market 
effect of his ovm recommendation may be motivated--con-
sciously or unconsciously-to recommend a given security not 
because of its potential for long-run price increase (which 
would profit the client), but because of its potential for short-
run price increase in response to anticipated activity from the 
recommendation (which would profit the adviser). 
"An investor seeking the advice of a registered investment 
adviser must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be 
permitted to evaluate such overlapping motivations, through 
appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving 
reliance (6) resulting in injury. However, the evolution of common-law deceit has 
witnessed a subsequent liberalization of its six technical elements. A false representation 
has been held to include a half-truth; a material fact to include an opinion or a·prom-
ise; and recklessness or negligence to constitute sufficient intent. In addition, the courts 
have developed a number of exceptions to the common-law rule that an action for deceit 
could not lie for mere nondisclosure. For example, it has been held to be fraudulent 
conduct when one who has made statements fails to disclose enough information to pre-
vent his words from becoming misleading. Also, it has been recognized that when one 
stands in a confidential or fiduciary relation to another, as does an investment adviser to 
his client, he has an affirmative duty to disclose all material facts. Simultaneously with 
the development of the common law, equity courts also fashioned relief for fraud, typi-
cally in the form of rescission, reformation, or restitution. Since equity was concerned 
primarily with restoring the parties to the status quo and not in rendering damages, 
the common-law elements of fraud, such as intent to injure and actual injury, were 
not required. See HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 643 (8th ed. 1962); PROSSER, TORTS 699-753 
(3d ed. 1964). 
60. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 
the Commission's request for a preliminary injunction was denied on the ground that 
there had been no showing of intent to injure or actual injury. A panel of the court 
of appeals affirmed the district court with one judge dissenting. 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 
1961). On a rehearing en bane the court of appeals reaffirmed by a 5-to-4 vote. 306 F.2d 
606 (2d Cir. 1962). 
61. Although accepting a broad construction of the antifraud provisions of the 
Investment Advisers Act, the Court noted that its holding that the Commission may 
seek an injunction for fraud without proving as elements either scienter or injury was 
consistent with the practice of equity courts. 375 U.S. 180, 192-95 (1963). Cf. note 59 
supra. 
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'two masters' or only one, 'especially ... if one of the masters 
happens to be economic self-interest.' " 62 
A. The Scope of Capital Gains 
The holding of Capital Gains raises several questions as to the 
application of a fiduciary duty to investment advisers. It should be 
determined whether the Court intended to adopt a high standard 
of conduct for both subscription advisers and investment counselors, 
and, if the Court did so intend, whether that result is desirable. 
Admitting the efficacy of the Court's holding insofar as it simply 
recognizes an investment adviser's fiduciary duty when a conflict 
of interest exists, it should further be determined to what degree 
the Court, in other circumstances, will adhere to this ·same high 
standard on the part of either the subscription adviser or invest-
ment counselor. 
In Capital Gains the Court formulated a fiduciary standard of 
professional responsibility for investment counselors as well as 
subscription advisers on the basis of the legislative intent under-
lying the Investment Advisers Act. Relying upon the findings of 
the Commission's 1938 study on the advisory industry63 and upon 
the testimony of investment advisers before Congress, the Court 
concluded that "the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects 
a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship.' "64 The Court noted, however, 
that virtually all of this evidence and testimony either concerned, 
or was elicited from, investment counselors. Included in the evi-
dence were the canons of ethics of a leading investment counselor 
organization; the Court suggested that the canons were representa-
tive of the high standards espoused by the industry.65 In imposing 
a fiduciary obligation upon subscription advisers, therefore, the 
Court was applying to the subscription adviser the high standard 
which it recognized as already existent for investment counselors. 
While it seems clear that the Court has adopted the same pro-
fessional standard for both types of investment advisers, there are 
a number of important considerations which militate against such 
a result. For example, the relationship benveen the subscription 
adviser and his client, in contrast to that between the investment 
counselor and his client, is an impersonal one in which the adviser 
62. 375 U.S. at 196. 
63. H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939). 
64. 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963). 
65. "While the study concentrated on investment advisory services which provide 
personalized counseling to investors, • • • the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency did receive communications from publishers of investment advisory services, 
• • . and the Act specifically covers 'any person who, for compensation, engages in the 
business of advising others, either directly or through publication or writings ..• .'" 
Id. at 187 n.15. 
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typically has no knowledge of the financial resources and objectives 
of his client, while the client, in turn, has little awareness of the 
qualifications and practices of the adviser.66 Therefore, it is proba- , 
ble that the client of the subscription adviser does not expect as 
confidential a relationship as does the client of the investment 
counselor. In addition, the high rate of turnover among the sub-
scription adviser's clients means that his livelihood is predicated 
upon his ability to attract and maintain a large number of sub-
scribers. Thus, he is continually engaged in an extensive selling 
effort, 67 making application of a fiduciary standard of conduct to 
his activities somewhat unrealistic. Moreover, the Special Study re-
vealed that many subscription advisers do not regard themselves 
as fiduciaries. 68 
Notwithstanding the disparity in the nature of the services per-
formed by subscription advisers and investment counselors, the 
imposition of a similar fiduciary standard upon each would be 
desirable; the importance to the public of thorough and accurate 
.analyses and opinions as to the investment value of securities far 
outweighs the burdens which would be placed upon subscription 
advisers. As Congress stated in enacting the Investment Advisers 
Act, the integrity of financial analyses and opinions, whether dis-
seminated by investment counselors or by subscription advisers, 
underlies the health of the entire securities industry.-09 Furthermore, 
subscription advisers generally hold themselves out to the public 
as investment analysis experts whose advice meets certain minimum 
standards of reliability and competence and is primarily for the 
benefit of the client. The expectation is thus created by the adviser 
that a professional responsibility, if not a confidential relationship, 
exists. Moreover, if subscription advisers intend to seek and main-
tain recognition as a profession, they should be held to the same 
high standards as are members of other professions. 
Although the Court in Capital Gains did not expressly indicate 
whether it intended to restrict application of an investment ad-
viser's fiduciary duty to situations where a conflict of interest exists, 
the broad language of the opinion suggests that the entire adviser-
client relationship was viewed as confidential.7° Thus, while the 
Court recognized differences between the types of services offered 
by subscription advisers and investment counselors,71 it did not 
draw any distinctions, such as the more impersonal character of the 
66. See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra. 
67. Special Study 367-69. Investment counselor advertising is very discreetly con-
ducted, in contrast to that of subscription advisers. 
68. Id. at 360. 
69. Investment Advisers Act§ 201, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § S0b-1 (1958). 
70. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. 
71. Sec note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
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relationship between the subscription adviser and his client, which 
would make imposition of a fiduciary duty upon subscription ad-
visers inapposite. Moreover, in prior judicial and Commission de-
cisions a fiduciary relationship between the investment adviser and 
his client has been recognized in a number of other situations. In 
Hughes v. SEC,72 the Commission revoked the license of a broker-
dealer who was also a registered investment counselor. The court 
of appeals affirmed the revocation, holding that the defendant's 
practice of omitting to disclose both the best price at which she 
could purchase securities in the open market and the price she 
actually charged her clients violated her fiduciary duty. Similarly, 
in a release which set forth the degree of disclosure required under 
section 206 when an investment counselor also acts as a broker-
dealer, the Commission stated that the broker-dealer-adviser is a 
fiduciary and must serve the best interests of his client with un-
divided loyalty. 73 The Commission has also held that a subscription 
adviser is "a fiduciary and, as such, owes a duty of fair and impar-
tial advice to his clients."74 The adviser in that instance was avidly 
recommending the purchase of a stock without revealing that he 
was being subsidized by the issuer. 
B. The Regulation of Subscription Advisers 
As the findings of the Special Study revealed, the need for the 
Commission to develop specific standards of conduct is acute among 
subscription advisers;75 this problem stems in large part from the 
relative ease with which unqualified individuals may develop a 
clientele in this field, 76 and from the lack of effective regulation 
until 1960 of subscription advisers by the Commission.77 The char-
acterization of subscription advisers as fiduciaries in Capital Gains 
should greatly facilitate the Commission's regulation of their con-
duct78 by permitting the SEC to impose upon the investment ad-
viser the common-law duties inherent in a confidential relationship. 
However, these duties are very broad and general and require re-
finement by the Commission into more carefully delineated stand-
72. 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
73. SEC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40, Feb. 5, 1945. 
74. Frank Payson Todd, 40 S.E.C. 303, 307 (1960). 
75. See Special Study 363-69. There is, of course, also a need to develop standards 
of conduct for investment counselors. The more confidential nature of the investment 
counselor-client relationship increases the opportunity for injury to the client. 
76. Id. at 146-48. 
77. See Comment, Investment Advice, 62 MICH. L. REv. 716,718 (1964). 
78. The broker-dealer has been placed under a similar fiduciary duty in certain 
situations by lower court and Commission decisions. See Norris &: Hirshberg, Inc. v. 
SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943). 
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arcls, which the Commission is attempting to establish through an 
increasing number of decisions.79 In Capital Gains the Court ap-
plied to a subscription adviser's undisclosed trading in recom-
mended securities the maxim that a fiduciary must avoid conflicts 
of interest and held that the adviser must disclose any holdings of 
a security which the adviser intends to sell shortly after recom-
mending its purchase to his clients.80 Similarly, the adviser must 
disclose his short interest in any security recommended for sale 
if he intends to cover his position shortly after the distribution of 
his market letter.81 Beyond these two situations, however, the scope 
of the requirement that an adviser disclose his trading activities in 
recommended securities is unclear. If an adviser purchases a security 
a year or two prior to, and sells shortly after, his recommendation, 
it is fairly clear that the conflict of interest is sufficient to warrant 
disclosure. If, on the other hand, an adviser acquires a stock shortly 
before recommending its purchase but retains it for a substantial 
period of time, for example, six months after the recommendation, 
arguably no conflict of interest would exist because the adviser 
would not benefit from the short-term appreciation effects of his 
advice. 82 Disclosure may nevertheless still be desirable since the 
danger is not only the benefit the adviser may derive from a breach 
of his fiduciary duty, but also his lack of impartiality when giving 
advice. 
While the Special Study noted a number of specific abusive 
practices by subscription advisers, two areas are particularly in need 
of regulatory standards. The first is subscription advisers' use of 
advertising. Because of the high rate of tum-over in subscribers, 83 
which, in tum, is appreciably affected by the level of investor 
interest in the market,84 subscription advisers must spend a sizeable 
amount for advertising to maintain and augment circulation. These 
advertisements are either mailed directly to prospective clients,85 
79. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra. 
80. The writer conducted his own survey of fifteen subscription adviser publications, 
primarily through trial subscriptions. The advisers selected were the larger and better 
known advisory services. In the course of the survey no disclosure of trading in 
recommended securities was discovered. A few advisers, however, stated specifically 
that all trading in recommended securities which might result in a conflict of interest 
on the part of officers, directors, and employees was prohibited. 
81. See note 57 supra. 
82. Studies of the effect of recommendations by investment advisers on stock market 
prices indicate that only a short-term influence is discernible. See Ferber, Short-Run 
Effects of Stock Market Services on Stock Prices, 13 J. FINANCE 80 (1958). 
83. See note 67 supra. 
84. "The stock services ebb and flow in demand. In bear markets, investors usually 
shun them. But in bull markets, the services flourish, ..• partly because investors look 
to the services' sometimes sophisticated analytical staffs to pick bargains in a market 
that's risen so high that bargains are harder and harder to find." Business Week, 
Sept. 5, 1959, p. 115. 
85. Typically, once a prospective client has indicated interest in subscribing to a 
1234 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63: 1220 
published in the financial section of newspapers or business maga-
zines, or di~seminated on radio and television. Like the broker-
dealer, therefore, the adviser is engaged in a selling effort not only 
to extol the merits of his own prognostications but also initially 
to persuade the prospective subscriber to invest in securities. While 
many subscription advisers pursue restrained advertising practices, 
some are given to misleading and overzealous representations which 
refer to particular securities or groups of securities as having ap-
preciated in the past or as being certain to appreciate significantly 
in the future, or which make unjustifiably bullish projections for 
future market behavior. 
To protect the prospective client who might rely upon these 
representations, the Commission promulgated regulations in 1961 
proscribing any third-party testimonial praising the adviser's 
organization and any direct or indirect references to specific past 
recommendations made by the adviser which would have been 
profitable to a client.86 The adviser is permitted, however, to list all 
recommendations made within the past year if the list contains the 
name of the security recommended, the date and nature of the 
recommendation, the price at which the recommendation was to 
be acted upon, and the price of the security as of the most recent 
practicable date. 87 The possible effect of this information is some-· 
what mitigated because the adviser must include on the first page 
of his letter a cautionary legend stating that "it should not be 
assumed that recommendations made in the future will be profitable 
or will equal the performance of the securities in this list."88 How-
ever, while these new regulations may have curtailed some abusive 
practices, exaggerated and suggestive advertisements are still com-
mon. 89 
To combat further abuses in the use of advertising, the Com-
mission could adopt two approaches. First, it could promulgate 
more regulations defining specific fraudulent and misleading ad-
vertising practices. Such practices should include advertisements 
particul;r subscription adviser, for example by obtaining a trial subscription, he 
receives weekly letters for a period of months beseeching him to acquire an annual 
subscription. Usually these letters will offer some inducement such as thirteen months 
service at the annual subscription rate or a free statistical handbook on securities. 
86. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (1964). The regulations also prohibit any claim that a 
chart or graph will predict the future of a stock or will aid in prediction, unless the 
limitations of that predictive method are set forth. Ibid. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid. 
89. The writer has noted that many of the same misleading advertising practices 
discovered by the Special Study are prevalent today. See Special Study 367-69. For 
example, the financial sections of many newspapers contain offers by subscription 
advisers to provide lists of "greatly undervalued" bonus stocks and names of low-priced 
stocks ready for a fast rise in price. 
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which purport to offer to new subscribers a list of particular securi-
ties claimed by the adviser to be certain to appreciate in the near 
future, for as a fiduciary the adviser has a duty to emphasize to the 
client the risks attending reliance upon such a list. Similarly, an 
advertisement claiming by reference to past predictions of the 
market's movements that the adviser's predictions are virtually in-
fallible should be proscribed, since it may mislead the potential 
investor into believing that the adviser can predict all future market 
movements in sufficient time to be advantageous to the investor. It 
seems inconsistent for the Commission to permit this type of repre-
sentation while prohibiting an adviser from listing specific securi-
ties he has recommended in the past. The major disadvantage to 
this approach is the difficulty of definition, which is reflected in 
the reluctance of the Commission to define misleading and fraudu-
lent practices other than on an ad hoc basis.90 
Second, the Commission could require that all subscription 
advisers' advertisements contain. cautionary legends similar to those 
now required when the adviser lists recommendations made within 
the past year.91 These warnings, if printed conspicuously on an 
advertisement, could have the salutary effect of preventing the ad-
viser from presenting to the prospective client a picture of safety 
and assured success in the securities market and would not impose 
upon the Commission the burden of having to define, a priori, 
fraudulent and misleading advertising practices. For example, if 
the adviser represents that an investment in insurance stocks ten 
years ago would have quadrupled and that the same appreciation 
may occur in the coming decade, he should be required to include 
a cautionary legend stating that past behavior of particular groups 
of securities is not an accurate or reliable indication of their future 
performance. 
The second area of subscription adviser conduct in need of 
regulation is that of research practices. The client who relies upon 
the recommendations contained in a market letter does so on the 
understanding that the adviser has performed a thorough and com-
petent analysis of each security. Unfortunately, however, as the 
Special Study noted, the research practices of advisers may vary 
substantially not only among different advisers but even within 
market reports published by the same adviser.92 The pressures of 
90. A self-regulatory body could be very instrumental in promulgating and 
enforcing such restrictions. For example, in the case of broker-dealers the New York 
Stock Exchange provides that all member firms' sales literature must be governed by 
the principle of "truthfulness and good taste." The NASD also applies specific 
standards and requires each member to maintain a separate file of all advertising and 
sales literature for a period of two years from the date of use. Id. at 376-87. 
91. See text accompanying note 88 supra. 
92. sp~cial Study 363-67. 
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competition and time, as well as the lack of an adequate staff, have 
led some subscription advisers to make only superficial analyses of 
recommended securities, to circulate unverified rumors or tips re-
ceived from corporate officers or publicity agents, and to publish 
another service's recommendations while representing that they 
have conducted their own independent research and appraisal.D3 
While the Commission has not promulgated any regulations to 
combat inadequate research practices, ad hoc decisions of the Com-
mission under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers 
Act have provided some standards of disclosure to guide subscrip-
tion advisers in the preparation and dissemination of investment 
advice. These include prohibition of a subscription adviser's making 
fraudulent representations such as a statement that the adviser's 
recommendation is based on an independent and impartial analy-
sis when in fact he is being paid to recommend the security,D4 or an 
assertion that the adviser's information emanates from reliable 
sources when the adviser is actually publishing unverified tips.D5 
Also, the adviser is proscribed from making representations which 
lack an adequate factual basis and are thus misleading, such as 
overoptimistic projections of a company's future profits.D6 The 
standards articulated by the Commission, however, have not proved 
adequate in view of the findings of the Special Study.D7 In part, 
this inadequacy stems from the reluctance of the Commission to 
provide comprehensive regulation; the result is that many of its 
own standards, such as the requirement of an adequate basis for a 
representation, remain undefined, and some aspects of subscription 
adviser conduct, such as the affirmative duty of disclosure based 
upon the fiduciary relationship, remain unregulated. 
To protect the investor who relies upon the express or implied 
representations of the subscription adviser that he has employed 
research practices which meet certain minimum standards of com-
petence and performance, the Commission could take three ap-
proaches. First, the subscription adviser could be required to 
disclose the source of all material information contained in his rec-
ommendations. Whether the adviser has relied upon an analysis of 
statistics compiled by Moody's or a phone conversation with an 
officer of the corporation, the adviser's source of information is 
important to the client in his own assessment of the recommenda-
tion. In this respect the Commission has permitted subscription 
advisers to use statements at the end of their recommendations that 
93. Ibid. 
94. Frank Payson Todd, 40 S.E.C. 303 (1960). 
95. In re Robbin, d/b/a the Profitmaker, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 149, 
Sept. 10, 1963. 
96. Security Forecaster Co., 39 S.E.C. 188 (1959). 
97. special Study 363-67. 
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their information is obtained from reliable sources and is believed 
to be reasonable, although accuracy is not guaranteed,98 so long as 
the statement does not mislead a prospective investor into believ-
ing that he has waived any right or action against the adviser for 
fraud under section 206.99 The justification for the use of these dis-
claimers in lieu of specific disclosures of sources has been, in part, 
that advisers could not obtain "inside information" if its source 
were disclosed. However, if by "inside information" is meant im-
portant information, not available to the public, derived from the 
officers, directors, or controlling interests of a corporation, this 
type of disclosure has consistently been proscribed in other contexts. 
Section l 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act allows recovery by the 
corporation of insiders' short-swing profits;100 and the antifraud 
provisions support an SEC injunctive action against the insider.101 
It would seem, therefore, that the Investment Advisers Act's regu-
latory scheme should not be influenced by this argument. The im-
portance to the client of knowing the source of the adviser's in-
formation outweighs the hardship imposed upon the adviser. 
Moreover, it is suspected that "inside information" is often no 
more than a rumor; disclaimers permit the adviser who has per-
formed no independent analysis to obscure that fact. 
Second, the Commission could require the adviser to disclose 
enough facts and informed opinions to constitute a reasonable 
basis for his recommendations. The adviser should not be per-
mitted merely to recommend the purchase or sale of a security 
without some adequate basis.102 For example, if an adviser believes 
98. See id. at 344-50. While hedge clauses are more prevalent in published broker-
dealer investment advice, the writer found the following hedge clauses in use by 
subscription advisers: "the information presented has been obtained from sources 
believed to be reliable, but its accuracy-and that of the opinions based thereon-is 
not guaranteed;" "the factual information contained herein has been derived from 
sources which are believed to be accurate, but is not guaranteed. Opinions and fore-
casts are based upon careful analyses, but are also not guaranteed and are subject to 
change without notice." 
99. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 58, April 10, 1952. 
100. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958). Section 16(b) requires insiders to 
disclose all transactions in stock of their own companies; it further attempts to deter the 
use of inside information by preventing insiders from turning over their stocks within 
a six-month period. See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
649 (1964). 
101. See Cady, Roberts &: Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The anti-fraud provisions are 
Securities Act § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958), 
Securities Exchange Act § l0(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958); Securities 
Exchange Act § 15(c)(l), 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l) (1958); Rule l0b-5, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1964), and Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.15cl-2 (1964). See Knauss, 
A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 607, 632-35 (1964). 
102. This approach differs significantly from the adequate basis test utilized by the 
Commission with respect to misleading representations. Under the former approach, 
the adviser would have an affirmative duty to disclose to the client reasonable facts to 
support his recommendation rather than merely being required to have an adequate 
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that a stock will appreciate in the short-run because mutual funds 
are going to buy in, this reason should be disclosed in place of an 
unsupported recommendation to purchase for short-term apprecia-
tion. While defining and enforcing the requirement of a reasonable 
basis might impose a difficult burden upon the Commission, that 
function could be delegated to a self-regulatory body. 
Finally, the Commission could ask Congress to attack the prob-
lem of inadequate research practices by imposing some minimum 
standards of training and experience in investment analysis for 
subscription advisers. If, as the Investment Adviser Act states, there 
does exist a great public interest in accurate and competent invest-
ment information, it seems unjustifiable to permit unqualified in-
dividuals to disseminate investment advice. Requiring training or 
experience will discriminate against the adviser who desires to 
base his recommendations upon some unconventional method; how-
ever, if there is to be effective regulation Congress must make a 
value judgment as to the permissible scope of investment analysis. 
Although a standard of minimum training and experience cannot 
ensure ethical behavior on the part of subscription advisers, it will 
increase the likelihood that they can perform the type of financial 
analysis which the investing public expects. Moreover, both train-
ing and experience can serve as a means of informing subscription 
advisers of their responsibilities and duties to their client. 
As a final addition to the foregoing proposed means of regulat-
ing abusive advertising and research practices, the Commission 
could require the subscription adviser to forward a prospectus with 
advertisements sent by mail, or upon request if the advertisement 
is published or broadcast.103 The prospectus, though short and in-
formal, should contain the following information: (I) whether the 
subscription adviser is organized as a corporation, partnership or 
individual proprietorship; (2) other lines of business in which the 
adviser is engaged; (3) the names, addresses and financial interests 
of each of the controlling interests and officers of the advisory firm; 
(4) a description of the educational background and the experience 
in securities analysis of the principals of the firm and of those em-
ployees engaged in investment analysis; (5) a statement of the theory 
and method of forecasting employed by the advisory firm; and (6) 
a recent balance sheet and income statement.104 The purpose of the 
basis to make a representation without being required to disclose it. See text accompany-
ing note 96 supra. 
103. Cf. Securities Act § 2(10), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(IO) 
(1958) ("tombstone advertisements'), and Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1964) ("identi-
fying statement'). Presently some subscription advisers do forward to prospective clients 
some information depicting the nature of the services offered and the research 
practices employed. E.g., American Investors Service; Moody's Investor Service. 
104. Much of this information is already required by registration form ADV which 
the adviser must file with the Commission. 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 57101-05 (1965). 
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prospectus would be to provide the potential client with sufficient 
information to make an informed and intelligent evaluation and 
choice of a subscription adviser. Too often, investors have no 
accurate or dependable information concerning the adviser and 
are dependent upon the few representations contained in advertis-
ing materials and in market reports received on a trial subscription 
basis. Furthermore, the disclosure contained in the suggested pro-
spectus would provide the investor with an additional safeguard 
against misleading or fraudulent advertising and inadequate re-
search practices by apprising him of the adviser's qualifications 
and method of research. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Special Study brought to public attention a number of 
problems existing among subscription advisers. The solution to 
most of these problems, such as the proper use of advertising and 
the disclosure of research practices, may be found in clarification 
of the duties and obligations of a subscription adviser toward his 
client. The Supreme Court in Capital Gains provided a partial 
answer viewing a subscription adviser as a fiduciary, subject to a 
duty of good faith and full disclosure. What is presently needed is 
a translation of this fiduciary concept into specific standards and 
criteria to guide the conduct and practices of the adviser. While 
the Commission has begun to undertake the task through the use 
of its adjudicatory and rule-making powers, its progress to date has 
been slow. Therefore, the Commission should place a renewed 
emphasis upon the regulation of subscription advisers, possibly 
along some of the lines suggested above. In addition, the responsi-
bility for reform should be shared both by the subscription ad-
visers and by the states. The advisers should be organized into a 
self-regulatory body empowered to develop and enforce regulatory 
standards upon its members. The states, on the other hand, should 
not only enact comprehensive legislation, comparable to the Uni-
form Securities Act, but should also provide stringent enforcement. 
By such steps the public interest in competent and accurate finan-
cial advice could be protected and promoted to a greater extent 
than at present. 
Charles G. Nickson 
